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The selling of a business as a going concern can have various tax consequences for 
both the seller and the purchaser. This is so whether the purchase price is determined 
with reference to the net asset value, i.e. gross assets less liabilities, or not. Accounting 
liabilities are always part of a business and therefore part of a business sales contract. 
The basic transaction is normally that some or all of the assets of the business are 
transferred to the purchaser who also assumes all or some of the liabilities of the 
business. The liabilities transferred may include various accounting provisions.  
 
To be more specific, if for example an bonus provision is due to the seller‘s employees 
and the provision is set-off in determining the sale price, has these cost been incurred 
in the production of income on the seller‘s side? If not, can the purchaser claim the 
deduction when they incur? Is the receipt of this amount capital or revenue in the 
hands of the purchaser? Uncertainty exists on the tax treatment of the transfer of these 
contingent liabilities. 
 
A taxpayer pays tax on his taxable income, which is calculated in terms of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‗the Act‘). In determining taxable income, a taxpayer is entitled 
to certain deductions which are, in general, covered by the general deduction formula. 
Unless expenditure qualifies for a deduction under one of the various sections which 
provides for specific deductions, an expense is only deductible if it complies with the 
requirements laid down in section 11(a) and is not a prohibited deduction under 
section 23. 
Whereas the denial of a deduction in the hands of the seller may be debatable, the 
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As the tax consequences of a sale agreement will depend on the way the agreement is 
structured, it is of the utmost importance that potential buyers and sellers of a business 
familiarize themselves with the different tax implications that may flow from the sale 
(Olivier, 2007:600). 
Companies prepare their financial statements within the strict rules and regulations of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (‗GAAP‘). Companies should reflect their 
financial status accurately and are therefore required to include any probable expense 
related to that year of assessment. These ‗probable expenses‘ are called provisions and 
have been the source of many different opinions and views.  
In the Tax Planning article, Keirby-Smith (1996a:2) highlights some of the dilemmas that 
are usually associated with accounting provisions: 
The challenges facing the accountant in the form of provisions have extended to the offices of 
the Commissioner for Inland Revenue, with the result that numerous organisations have been 
on the receiving end of investigations by Inland Revenue, which have resulted in the add-back 
of provisions previously claimed and allowed for normal tax. 
Considering the number of sales of businesses which take place in South Africa every year, 
it is extraordinary that there is only one (reported) decision of the tax court,  
i.e. Income Tax Case  No. 18391, dealing with the question of how a provision for future 
expenditure (contingent liabilities) in the business, taken over by the purchaser, must be 
dealt with for normal tax purposes. Simply stated, the correct treatment will always depend 
on the type of provision and the actual set of facts of the particular case. It is true that these 
questions have been analysed on many occasions. Yet, it seems that many well-respected 
tax specialists (including some within the South African Revenue Service (‗SARS‘)) have 
come to different conclusions, making it all the more surprising that the principles have not 
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1.2 Objectives and approach (layout of the study) 
Chapter two introduces the general principles that determine the deductibility of an 
expense.  
Chapter three of this thesis, and also the main focus of the study, considers the reported 
ITC 1839, decided in the South Gauteng Tax Court on 17 March and 14 May 2009. The 
court had to consider whether tax-deductible expenditure had been incurred in paying the 
purchaser to assume the obligation to pay contingent liabilities. The court found that the 
deduction of the relevant amount was not allowable in terms of the  
the Act. 
Arguments from the taxpayer (hereinafter seller, appellant or taxpayer) and SARS 
(hereinafter Commissioner, respondent or SARS) will be discussed, focusing on the 
taxpayer‘s side.  The relevant legislative provisions and other cases will be referred to and 
discussed, but only to the extent as required by the ambit of this study. English and 
Australian cases that are relevant and central to the study will also be discussed. 
Chapter four will consider the treatment of other relevant contingencies not discussed in 
the ITC case and chapter five will briefly highlight the position of the purchaser. Chapter 
six will, in a concise manner, discuss recoupments and chapter seven will look into the 
importance of the wording of contracts.  
The primary objective of this study is to concentrate on ITC 1839 and the reasoning of the 
counsels and the judge. The secondary objectives will be as discussed in chapter two, four, 
five, six and seven.  
1.3 Research methodology 
The research methodology used was the historic method. A review of the literature was 
undertaken to determine the income tax consequences during the sale of contingencies. 
1.4 Limitation of scope of study 
This study is from the perspective that the seller and the purchaser are both companies and 
incorporated, established or formed in the Republic of South Africa (‗RSA‘) or which has 
its place of effective management in the RSA. A going concern is defined as the net asset 
value (assets less liabilities) of the business. The purpose is not to deal with all tax issues 
relevant to the transfer of a business. Also, capital gains tax implications do not fall within 
the scope of this study.   
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2 OVERVIEW OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES  
2.1 General deduction formula 
Certain sections of the Act determine the deductibility of an expense. To be classified as 
deductible, expenditure must comply with the requirements as laid down in section 11(a) 
and not be prohibited under section 23. The combined working of these sections of the Act 
is commonly known as the general deduction formula (Keirby-Smith 1996a:2). 
Section 11(a) of the Act deals specifically with the treatment of expenses incurred, in the 
carrying on of any trade. ‗Trade‘ is defined in section 1 of the Act as follows: 
“trade” includes every profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or 
venture, including the letting of any property and the use of or the grant of permission to use 
any patent as defined in the Patents Act, 1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978), or any design as defined in 
the Designs Act, 1993 (Act No. 195 of 1993), or any trade mark as defined in the Trade Marks 
Act, 1993 (Act No. 194 of 1993), or any copyright as defined in the Copyright Act, 1978 (Act 
No. 98 of 1978), or any other property which is of a similar nature. 
 
Section 11(a) of the Act lays down the requirements regarding expenses:  
11.   General deductions allowed in determination of taxable income.—For the purpose of 
determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on any trade, there shall 
be allowed as deductions from the income of such person so derived— 
(a) expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of the income, provided such 
expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature. 
 
Accordingly expenses must be actually incurred (in the specific year of assessment), in the 
production of income and also be not of a capital nature to qualify for a deduction in terms 
of section 11(a) of the Act. If all of these requirements are complied with, the taxpayer will 
be entitled to a deduction for income tax purposes.  
 
Section 23 of the Act covers, in its entirety, deductions that are prohibited in the 
determination of taxable income. The subsections that will be focused on in this study are 
section 23(e), 23(f) and 23(g) of the Act because they are specifically mentioned in  
ITC 1839. Section 23(e), 23(f) and 23(g) of the Act reads as follows: 
23.   Deductions not allowed in determination of taxable income.—No deductions shall in 
any case be made in respect of the following matters, namely—  
(e) income carried to any reserve fund or capitalized in any way; 
(f) any expenses incurred in respect of any amounts received or accrued which do not 
constitute income as defined in section one; and 
(g) any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to which 




2.2 General deduction formula – actually incurred  
Relevant court cases will be briefly discussed to clarify the concept of ‗actually incurred‘ 
as set out in section 11(a) of the Act.  
 
Firstly, expenses actually incurred and paid in the same tax year are deductible under 
section 11(a) of the Act. However, expenses incurred in one financial year with payment 
due in the following financial year are also deductible in the first year.  
 
Two court cases confirm this deduction: 
In Port Elizabeth Tramway Co Ltd v CIR2, it was found that an expense was actually 
incurred in one financial year, although no payment was made for this expense at the time.  
The commentary from Watermeyer AJP in the abovementioned case:  
 
But expenses ―actually incurred‖ cannot mean, ‗actually paid‘.  So long as the liability to pay 
them actually has been incurred they may be deductible. 
 
In the Caltex Oil case3, it was held that ‗expenditure actually incurred‘ does not necessitate 
the transfer of payment during the particular year of assessment. Botha JA submitted that:  
 
It is in the tax year in which the liability for the expenditure is incurred and not in the tax year 
in which it is actually paid (if paid in a subsequent year), that the expenditure is actually 
incurred for the purposes of s 11(a).  
 
What can be derived from these two cases is that ‗actually incurred‘ therefore qualifies the 
expenditure to be due and payable. However, even when expenditure is incurred within a 
particular assessment year, the payment can be made in a subsequent year.  
 
Expenses that are conditional upon the outcome of future events cannot be deducted, as 
discussed in the following three court cases. 
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In Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI4 Hoexter JA expanded upon the term ‗actually incurred‘:  
 
Die vereiste dat die onkoste ―werklik aangegaan‖ moet wees, het egter tot gevolg dat moontlike 
toekomstige uitgawes wat bloot as waarskynlik geag word nie ingevolge art 11(a) aftrekbaar is 
nie. Alleen onkoste ten opsigte waarvan die belastingbetaler volstrekte en onvoorwaardelike 
aanspreeklikheid op die hals gehaal het, mag in die betrokke belastingjaar afgetrek word. 
 
In Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR5, Corbett JA added:  
 
…it is clear that only expenditure (otherwise qualifying for deduction) in respect of which the 
taxpayer has incurred an unconditional legal obligation during the year of assessment in question 
may be deducted in terms of s 11(a) from income returned for that year. The obligation may be 
unconditional ab initio or, though initially conditional, may become unconditional by fulfilment 
of the condition during the year of assessment; in either case the relative expenditure is deductible 
in that year. But if the obligation is initially incurred as a conditional one during a particular year 
of assessment and the condition is fulfilled only in the following year of assessment, it is 
deductible only in the latter year of assessment (the other requirements of deductibility being 
satisfied). 
 
In CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd6, similar conclusions were made:  
 
A liability is contingent where there is a claim which is disputed, at any rate genuinely disputed 
and not vexatiously or frivolously for the purposes of delay. …The taxpayer could not properly 
claim the deduction in that tax year, and the Receiver of Revenue could not, in the light of the 
onus provision of s 82 of the Act, properly allow it.  
 
2.3 General deduction formula – in the production of income 
The Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways case was one of the first cases in which the meaning 
‗in the production of income‘ was considered. Expenditure must be closely linked to the 
business operation, and then the expense will be incurred ‗in the production of income‘ and 
deductible in terms of section 11(a) of the Act.  
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The principles laid down in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways case are frequently used in 
later cases that discuss the term ‗in the production of income‘. Therefore only one later 
case will be discussed, as this is adequate to identify the meaning of ‗in the production of 
income‘.  
In Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways, the judge held that7:  
 
…all expenses attached to the performance of a business operation bona fide performed for the 
purposes of earning income are deductible whether they are necessary for its performance or 
attached to it by chance or are bona fide incurred for the more efficient performance of such 
operation provided they are so closely connected with it that they may be regarded as part of 
the cost of performing it. 
 
It is not necessary that each item of expenditure should directly or indirectly lead to the 
production of income as no expenditure, strictly speaking, actually produces income. This 
was observed in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways (at page 13):  
 
Taking these in turn, the words of statute are ―actually incurred‖ not ―necessarily incurred‖. 
The use of the word ―actually‖ as contrasted with the word ―necessarily‖ may widen the field 
of deductible expenditure. 
 
One needs to look at a business as a whole set of operations all directed towards producing 
the income when establishing whether an expense has been incurred in the production of 
income (at page 15).  
 
If it were necessary to establish a strict causal nexus between the expenditure and the 
production of income, one would be investigating the business efficacy of the taxpayer, 
which is not the function of the Income Tax Act or the Commissioner (ITC 16008). 
Income is produced by a series of actions, attendant upon which are expenses, which are 
deductible if they are so closely linked to such acts as to be regarded as part of the cost of 
performing them. The other two requirements of section 11(a) of the Act must have also 
been complied with for an expense to be deductible.  
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In Sub-Nigel ltd v CIR9 the court held that the fact that no income is actually earned is 
irrelevant as long as the expense is incurred for the purpose of earning income. The 
purpose of the expenditure must be considered to establish whether the expense is incurred 
to earn income, and if so, the requirement of ‗in the production of income‘ is complied 
with.  
 
2.4 General deduction formula – not of a capital nature 
To distinguish between a capital and a non-capital expenditure, the purpose of the 
expenditure must be considered. Case law lays down tests for distinguishing between 
capital and non-capital expenditures.  
The true nature of the transaction should be examined to determine the capital or revenue 
nature of the attendant expenditure. In New State Areas v CIR10, Watermeyer CJ 
summarised a test as:  
 
The conclusion to be drawn from all of these cases seems to be that the true nature of each 
transaction must be inquired into in order to determine whether the expenditure attached to it is 
capital or revenue expenditure. Its true nature is a matter of fact and the purpose of the 
expenditure is an important factor; if it is incurred for the purpose of acquiring a capital asset 
for the business it is capital expenditure even if it is paid in annual instalments; if, on the other 
hand, it is in truth no more than part of the cost incidental to the performance of the income 
producing operations, as distinguished from the equipment of the income-producing machine, 
then it is a revenue expenditure even if it is paid in a lump sum. 
 
Various tests or guidelines have been enounced by the courts to determine or test the 
revenue or capital nature of expenditure. None of these tests is, however, absolutely 
conclusive, and each individual case should be considered on its own unique facts and 
circumstances. 
 
If expenditure incurred otherwise qualifies as a deduction but is capital in nature, the 
expenditure cannot be deducted in terms of section 11(a) of the Act.  
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As noted in IFRS11, accounting provisions may be created under IAS 37 which forms part 
of GAAP. Because accounting provisions are usually ‗probable‘ expenses that are provided 
for, the general deduction formula as set out above must be utilised to determine if these 
accounting provisions are deductible for income tax purposes (Keirby-Smith, 1996a).  
Keeping chapter two in mind, the next chapter will discuss ITC 1839 in more detail.  
 
3 INCOME TAX CASE NO. 1839 
3.1 Introduction 
In the ITC 1839 (at page 61) case the South Gauteng Tax Court had to consider whether the 
taxpayer company, the seller of a retail business, was entitled to deduct from its taxable 
income in terms of section 11(a) of the Act the amounts of three underlying contingent 
liabilities that were to be taken over by the purchaser in terms of the sale agreement of the 
business as a going concern.   
The purchase price was defined in the sale agreement as ‗the amount equal to the sum of 
R800 million and the rand amount of the liabilities‘. An annexure to the sale agreement 
arrived at the net amount owing of R800 million from the gross purchase price of  
R1.1 billion, the difference was represented by the value of assets of R1.1 billion less 
liabilities of approximately R311 million. Included in the R311 million, the appellant had 
made certain accounting provisions, contingent liabilities, in respect of post-retirement 
medical aid benefits for the appellant‘s staff; long term bonuses for such staff and 
obligations to carry out repairs in respect of certain leases. 
As at 1 March 2004 these provisions were still contingent. These provisions, which the 
purchaser had agreed to assume, as part of the sale, amounted to R17 million. 
The respondent had issued an additional assessment in respect of the taxpayer‘s 2004 year 
of assessment in which he had disallowed an amount of roughly 
R23 million which had been claimed by the appellant as a deduction in respect of the 
aforementioned provisions.  
                                                 
11
 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), Volume 1B, 2008/2009, International Accounting  
Standard 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (IAS 37), Objective paragraph of  
IAS 37  
 
 9 
Chapter three will explore the ITC 1839 case. It is also understood that this case is on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
3.2 Background on the ITC 1839 contingencies (i.e. post employment benefits, 
bonus/leave payments and repairs and maintenance of capital assets) 
 
POST EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Post employment medical care benefit is discussed as this is one of the contingencies 
disallowed in ITC 1839. An expense may be deductible for income tax purposes if the 
requirements of section 11(a) of the Act are complied with.  
 
The expense must be actually incurred, in the production of income and must not be of a 
capital nature. A provision created for post employment benefits is therefore not deductible 
under section 11(a) of the Act as it usually represents actuarial risk, if the actuarial 
calculations indicate that the employer‘s obligation may have increased from the original 
calculations, and not an amount actually incurred (Kroukamp 2006:29). 
 
BONUS/LEAVE PAYMENTS 
It is assumed (and understood from the case) that the provision taken over was created to 
provide for the seller‘s contingent liability to pay long term bonuses to staff that are still in 
the seller‘s employment before the sale of the business.  
 
The following paragraphs are Olivier‘s (2007:614-617) view on bonus and leave 
payments: 
 
Position of the seller  
The seller will only be entitled to make use of a section 11(a) deduction for expenditure 
incurred on bonuses and leave if an absolute and unconditional obligation to pay existed 
during the year of assessment. Conditional future expenditure cannot be deducted, as there 
is no absolute and unconditional liability to pay it. 
 
Section 23E(2) of the Act specifically deals with leave payments and provides that an 
employer is entitled to deduct leave pay only in the year of assessment in which the leave 
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pay is actually paid or has become due and payable. To be deductible, the employer has to 
pay or incur an absolute and unconditional liability to pay. Whether he has such a liability 
at any point of time will depend on the facts of each case.  
 
If the seller‘s year of assessment ends before the payment or accrual date of the bonuses or 
leave payments, he will not be entitled to any deduction as the expenditure would not have 
been ‗actually incurred‘. There may be instances where, at the end of a tax year, an 
employer has an absolute and unconditional liability for a portion of the bonus or leave 
payments, despite the fact that the date for payment has not yet arrived. For example, if, in 
terms of the employment contracts, the employees become entitled to a pro rata portion of 
the annual bonus or leave payment on the completion of each month‘s service, then at the 
end of the employer‘s tax year the employer will have an absolute and unconditional 
liability for a portion of the bonus or leave payments and will be entitled to deduct these 
amounts.  
 
The balance of provision, for future conditional liabilities, has to be added back for tax 
purposes. As section 23B(3) prohibits a deduction under section 11(a), if a specific section 
deals with the deductibility of the expenditure, as s 23E does, the seller cannot deduct 
expenditure incurred on leave pay under section 11(a).  
 
The possibility exists that if the seller claims a deduction for an actual liability under 
section 23E and the purchaser actually pays the creditors, there may be a recoupment under 
section 8(4)(m) in the hands of the seller equal to the amount of the obligation from which 
the seller was relieved. This will only be the case if it can be argued that the effect of 
payment by the purchaser discharges the obligation, and the seller is released from the 
obligation for no consideration.  
 
On this assumption, any payment made by the seller in return for being released from the 
obligation has to be taken into account. If the seller did not make a specific payment to the 
purchaser for assuming future contingent liabilities, subsequently discharged by the 
purchaser, a recoupment may well arise. If, in return for the release of future contingent 
liabilities, a lower purchase price is accepted, it is doubtful whether this will be taken into 
account. The Commissioner can assess the seller on the basis that the whole of the 
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deduction was recouped. It would then be up to the seller to prove that, although strictly 
speaking there was a recoupment, the economic effect or benefit of the recoupment is zero.  
 
The seller should be in a position to prove to what extent the purchase price was lowered in 
return for the purchaser assuming the liability, as deducted by the seller12. If a specific 
amount was paid by the seller to the purchaser for the latter assuming future bonus or leave 
payments, the extent of the recoupment will depend on the amount paid. If the amount paid 
is less than the deduction claimed by the seller, the seller would have recouped the 
shortfall. From the seller‘s point of view, to avoid a possible recoupment once the 
purchaser pays the creditors, it is advisable to expressly pay the purchaser for assuming 
liabilities previously deducted by the seller13.  
 
If the seller paid the purchaser a specific amount for assuming bonus and leave obligations, 
he will only be entitled to a deduction under section 11(a), to the extent that he can prove 
that the expenditure was incurred in the production of income14.  
 
The seller should not, as an alternative arrangement, retain the obligation to make bonus or 
leave payments as he will not, after the take-over date, be entitled to a deduction as 
payments to erstwhile employees may not be regarded as incurred in the production of 
income or for the purposes of trade. It would be difficult to argue that the liability to pay 
the bonuses or leave payments results from the conditional liabilities incurred while 
carrying on his income-earning operations becoming unconditional. The condition would 
have been the employees concerned being still in the employment of the seller, which they 
will not be when the liability becomes unconditional.  
 
Position of the purchaser  
If the purchaser receives an amount as payment for assuming actual liabilities, it may be 
argued that he will be taxed on the receipt. On the assumption that the amount is indeed 
taxable a deduction under section 24C may be claimed. A deduction may also be claimed 
                                                 
12
 To prove to what extent the purchase price was lowered is not always as straightforward as one would 
imagine; see below for further discussion on ITC 1839. 
13
 Also refer to chapter five and six for a further brief discussion. 
14
 In ITC 1839 further issues were raised, with regards to the contingencies, namely: has there been 
expenditure actually incurred?; was the expenditure of a capital nature?; incurred for the purpose of trade? 
and whether not limited according to section 23(f) and (g).  
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under section 11(a) when the leave and bonus payments are actually incurred. The end 
result is that the purchaser will be taxed on that part of the amount not used to pay bonuses 
or leave.  
 
If the purchaser (as is normally required) takes over the employment contracts of the 
employees pursuant to the purchase of the business and actually pays the bonuses or leave 
payments pursuant to its obligations under the contracts, the purchaser will be incurring the 
expenditure in the production of income. The Tax Court is currently of the view that a 
purchaser will be entitled to a section 11(a) deduction in circumstances where no economic 
loss was suffered as the purchase price was reduced to provide for the outstanding leave 
and bonus obligations. In unreported case number 11107, delivered by the  
Pretoria Tax Court on 29 April 2005, the court refused to accept the SARS view that the 
subsequent payment of the leave and bonus payments was of a capital nature. A different 
conclusion was reached by the Privy Council in New Zealand in Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue v New Zealand Forest Research Institute Ltd. It was held that expenditure 
incurred on the acquisition of the provisions/liabilities represents capital expenditure in the 
hands of the purchaser. The reason is that expenditure paid for the acquisition of assets is 
capital expenditure. In other words, the expenditure is more closely related to the income 
producing concern than to the income producing activities. The result is that subsequent 
discharge by the purchase of the obligation represents expenditure of a capital nature 
notwithstanding the fact that the original payment would have been of a revenue nature.  
 
It is interesting to note that in Case Number 11107 the court found that the expenditure 
incurred did ‗not constitute money spent in creating or acquiring an income-producing 
concern, or in the acquisition by the taxpayer of the means of production, i.e. property, 
plant, tools, etc. which he uses in the performing of his income earning operations‘, 
whereas in New Zealand Forest Research Institute this was held to be the case.  
Clearly, where the payment is made as part of expenditure incurred in the acquisition of an 
income producing concern, the expenditure is of a capital nature and should not be 
deductible for income tax purposes.  
 
Based on the reasoning of the court in this case, from the purchaser‘s point of view, it is 
not advisable to be paid for taking over of the obligations, but rather to accept a lower 
purchase price. In this situation the purchaser will in effect obtain a deduction for an 
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expense for which he will not have had a taxable receipt or accrual nor will he have 
suffered any actual expense. 
 
REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF CAPITAL ASSETS 
For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that a provision is created for anticipated 
repairs to, and maintenance of, buildings and other capital assets which occur irregularly 
and are not the subject of any specific commitment at the take over date in the sale 
agreement.  
 
The following paragraphs are Olivier‘s (2007:611-612) view on repairs and maintenance 
of capital assets: 
 
Position of the seller  
The seller will not be entitled to a deduction equal to the provision for anticipated repair 
and maintenance expenditure, as it will not have been actually incurred. In addition, a 
deduction is specifically prohibited by section 23(e) of the Act. As he will not have 
claimed a deduction, a recoupment will not arise under section 8(4)(m) where as a result of 
the sale the seller no longer has to effect the improvements.  
 
If the seller pays the purchaser a specific amount as compensation for future costs on 
repairs, he may not be able to claim a deduction under section 11(a), as the expenditure 
will not be incurred in the production of income. The purpose of the expenditure is not to 
produce income, but to bring an end to trading activities15. If the seller can successfully 
argue that the purpose of the expenditure was to produce income in the form of the 
purchase price, which is partially taxable, then he will be entitled to a pro rata deduction.  
 
The seller should not retain the obligation to repair or maintain the assets as he will not be 
entitled to a deduction for expenditure incurred. At the time the expenditure is incurred 
(i.e. at the time when the seller acquires an absolute and unconditional liability for the 
expenditure) the seller will no longer be using the assets for the production of income or 
for the purposes of trade. 
 
                                                 
15
 In ITC 1839 it was also argued (respondent‘s counsel) that the purpose of the expenditure is not to produce 
income, but rather to bring an end to the trading activities. 
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Position of the purchaser  
The purchaser will be entitled to deduct the expenditure once it is actually incurred, 
provided that it is incurred on repairs and not on improvements. 
 
If the seller pays the purchaser a specific amount for assuming the liabilities, the purchaser 
will be taxed on the receipt or accrual. The purchaser should be entitled to a section 24C 
and, eventually, a section 11(a) deduction in the year of assessment in which the repairs 
are affected. The net result will be that the purchaser will be taxed on that portion of the 
payment which is not spent on repairs or maintenance.  
 
From the purchaser‘s point of view it is advisable not to accept a specific amount as 
payment for the obligation to effect the repairs and maintenance (as their cost will, in any 
event, be deductible by him), but rather to accept a reduced purchase price. 
 
3.3 Wording of the contract in ITC 1839 
The wording of the contract is submitted as follows (at page 64): 
 
Clause 4 of the Sale Agreement reads as follows: ‗In consideration for the sale of the 
Business, the Purchaser will pay the purchase price…‘ The ‗Business‘ was defined in 
clause 2.2.3 of the Sale Agreement as ‗the retail clothing business conducted by the Seller 
under the style of ‗XXX‘, which includes the Business Assets of the Seller, the Liabilities 
and the Contracts of the Effective Date‘. The ‗Purchase Price‘ was defined in clause 2.2.21 
of the Sale Agreement as ‗the amount equal to the sum of R800 000 000 (eight hundred 
million rand) and the rand amount of the Liabilities‘. ‗Liabilities‘ were defined in clause 
2.2.16 of the Sale Agreement to mean ‗all of the liabilities arising in connection with the 
Business, in respect of any period prior to the Effective Date, known to the Seller as at the 
Effective Date‘. 
The appellant alleges that, upon the sale of its business, it made certain accounting 
provisions and that the relevant amount is the aggregate of the following accounting 
provisions made by it – Bonus: long term R6 394 111; Full repairing lease R900 000 and 
Medical expenses R11 698 880 (reduced to approximately R9 800 000).  
Totalling approximately R17 million. 
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The liabilities in the above paragraph formed part of the total liabilities in the sum of  
R329 440 402. 
In terms of clause 6.1 of the Sale Agreement the parties agreed the following: 
 
The Purchase Price shall be discharged as follows by the Purchaser: 
6.1.1. as consideration for the Inter Company Loans and Other Loans, the Purchaser 
will assume an equivalent amount of the Accounts Payable; 
and 
6.1.2 as consideration for the remaining Business Assets: 
 6.1.3.1 the Purchaser will assume the remainder of the Liabilities, and 
 6.1.2.2 the Purchaser will with effect from (sic) the Effective Date owe the Seller
  R800 000 000,00 (eight hundred million rand) as a loan and which will be 
  reflected as a loan account in the books of the Seller. 
 
The above is therefore the manner of discharge of the purchase price. In terms of clause 5.1 
of the Sale Agreement, the parties agreed that ‗the Purchase Price (would be) allocated as 
follows to the Business Assets‘: 
5.1.1 Immovable Property, the net book value as reflected in the Effective Date 
Management Accounts‘. 
5.1.2 Plant, machinery, equipment, vehicles, trade debtors, inter company loans, 
other loans and inventory, the net book value as reflected in the Effective Date 
Management Accounts. 
5.1.3 Trade Debtors, ‗the net book value as reflected in the Effective Date 
Management Accounts‘. 
5.1.4 Inter Company Loans, ‗the net book value as reflected in the Effective Date 
Management Accounts‘. 
5.1.5 Other loans, ‗the net book value as reflected in the Effective Date Management 
Accounts‘. 
 5.1.6 Inventory, ‗the net book value as reflected in the Effective Date Management 
  Accounts‘. 
5.1.7 Cash and cash equivalents, ‗the face value as reflected in the Effective Date 
Management Accounts‘. 
5.1.8 Trademarks, ‗the market value determined by the Seller as at the Effective 
Date‘. 




The ‗Effective Date Management Accounts‘ were defined in clause 2.2.8 of the Sale 
Agreement to mean: 
 
the management accounts reflecting the financial affairs of the Business on the day 
immediately preceding the Effective Date, which shall be attached as Annexure ‗A‘ 
hereto as soon as possible after the Effective Date. 
 
Annexure ‗A‘ of the Sale Agreement is headed ‗Analysis of purchase price‘ and allocates 
and amount of R800 million. The amount of R800 million is the difference between the 
aggregate of the positive amounts reflected in Annexure ‗A‘ (R1 111 692 717) and the 
aggregate of the negative amounts reflected in Annexure ‗A‘ (R311 692 717). 
 
In terms of clause 10 of the Sale Agreement, the parties agreed to ‗comply with their 
respective obligations in relation to the employees, as set out in Annexure ‗E‘. 
 
In terms of paragraph 1.2 of Annexure ‗E‘, the parties agreed that the purchaser, C, would 
be substituted in place of the seller in respect of all employment contracts in existence 
immediately before the effective date. Paragraph 2.1 of Annexure ‗E‘ reads as follows: 
 
The Seller shall bear the cost of salaries, PAYE income tax, employer UIF, pension and 
medical aid contribution, leave pay and other benefits in respect of the Employees 
accrued in respect of any period up to and including the Effective Date. 
 
Paragraph 2.2 of Annexure ‗E‘ reads as follows: 
 
The Purchaser shall bear the costs of salary, PAYE income tax, employer UIF, pension 
and medical aid contributions and other benefits in respect of the Employees in respect 
of the period after the Effective Date. 
 
Paragraph 2.3 of Annexure ‗E‘ reads as follows: 
 
For the purposes of section 197(7)(4) of the Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995, as 
amended (‗LRA‘), the Parties will agree on or before the Effective Date, the valuation 
up (sic) and including the Effective Date of:  
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2.3.1 accrued salary, PAYE income tax, employer UIF, pension and medical aid 
contributions in respect of Employees; 
2.3.2 leave pay accrued to the Employees; 
2.3.3 severance pay that would have been payable to the Employees in the event of a 
dismissal by reason of the Seller‘s operational requirements; and 
2.3.4 any other payments that have accrued to Employees but have not been paid… 
 
Clause 10 read with Annexure ‗E‘ provided for a complete assumption of responsibility by 
the purchaser in respect of amounts owing to employees in accordance with section 197 of 
the LRA.  
The appellant has not been able to locate any valuation as contemplated in paragraph 2.3 of 
Annexure ‗E‘. 
Paragraph 2.5 of Annexure ‗E‘ reads as follows: 
 
On the Effective date the Seller shall pay the Purchaser the sum of the calculation 
referred to in 2.2 above in respect of accrued salary, leave pay, PAYE income tax, 
employer UIF, pension and medical aid contributions in respect of the Employees in 
respect of the period up to and including the Effective Date, which amounts have not 
otherwise been paid in respect of the Employees…‘ 
No payment was made by the appellant in cash in respect of the liability in paragraph 2.2 
of Annexure ‗E‘ but C, as the purchaser, assumed all liabilities in respect of employees. 
3.4 Appellant – introduction 
In ITC 1839 the taxpayer contented that it was entitled to the deduction in terms of section 
11(a) read with section 23(g) of the Act. It also argued that, on a proper construction of the 
agreement of sale, it had foregone the portion of the purchase price representing the 
liabilities in consideration for the purchaser assuming those liabilities and therefore this 
portion of the purchase price represented ‗expenditure actually…incurred‘ within the 
meaning of section 11(a) of the Act. 
It argued further that expenditure incurred by the taxpayer to rid itself of anticipated or 
contingent revenue expenses were generally itself of a revenue nature. The taxpayer 
contented that that the conclusion of the sale agreement with the purchaser gave rise to 
incurred expenditure towards the sale agreement with the purchaser in an amount equal to 
the contingent liabilities in issue and it was this expenditure that the taxpayer sought to 
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deduct and, accordingly, the expenditure had actually incurred within the meaning of 
section 11(a) of the Act, i.e. there had been a diminution of the taxpayer‘s patrimony the 
same as a loss and thus the relevant amount was deductible (at page 61). 
 
The court accepted that had the taxpayer retained its business and continued to trade, the 
amounts would be deductible when they became unconditional. The court further was 
dismissive of the argument that expenditure, like losses, do not necessarily arise from a 
legal obligation owed by the taxpayer to a third party. The taxpayer‘s argument was that 
expenditure is wide enough to encompass all actual quantifiable diminutions or prejudicial 
effects suffered by the taxpayer‘s patrimony – instead of strictly legal concept expenditure 
and losses is an economic or commercial concept. However the court was of the opinion 
that even if it is to be accepted that the economic consequences of a transaction is to be 
examined rather than ‗strict law or obligations‘, there were in fact an increase in the 
taxpayer‘s patrimony – the economic consequence according to the court was the taxpayer 
was relieved of the risks that the contingent liabilities would materialise and received  
R800 million risk free in return. 
 
The court also did not favour the argument that the assets and liabilities of the taxpayer did 
not lose their individual identities as a result of the disposal of the business as the sale of 
the business itself in strict law consists of the sale of individual assets and the assignment 
of liabilities which resulted in the set off of the assets and liabilities and the net purchase 
price of R800 million, as the taxpayer had already made the argument in respect of 
expenditure incurred that the economic consequences of the transaction should be 
examined, rather than a strict legal incurral of an obligation; according to the court this was 
to ‗have one‘s cake and eat it at the same time‘. The court was of the opinion that one must 
have a holistic, economic and commercial view of the transaction, and that that there was 
no diminution in the taxpayer‘s patrimony, but actually the converse (at page 63). 
 
The taxpayer had further attempted to identify the nature of the expenditure by 
extrapolating principles from English case law that support the conclusion that lump sum 
payments or expenditure do not necessarily alter the fact that the ‗expenditure‘ in question 
could not be indentified as being ‗incurred‘ in the production of income and for the 
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purposes of trade. However the court found that this was irrelevant as it was of the opinion 
that it was never misled by the lump sum characteristics of the payments (at page 71).  
 
The three underlying contingent liabilities are R9.8 million in respect of post-retirement 
medical aid liability; R6.3 million in respect of long-term bonuses and R0.9 million in 
respect of full repairing leases, amounting to approximately R17 million. 
 
The heads of argument, as per this tax court judgement, will be looked at in some more 
detail in the following paragraphs.  
 
3.5 Arguments in favour of the appellant  
From the aforementioned paragraphs it is already clear that several tax consequences arise 
during the sale of a business and carefully consideration is therefore needed.     
 
ITC 1839 adds the following questions to the already, not easily deciphered, set of rules: 
 
did the conclusion of the sale agreement with the purchaser give rise to incurred 
expenditure?; did the seller forego (i.e. was there a set-off?) a portion of the purchase 
price?; is expenditure incurred by the taxpayer to rid itself of anticipated or contingent 
revenue expenses generally of a revenue nature?; and was there a step-down of the 
taxpayer‘s patrimony the same as a loss and thus the relevant amount was deductible?   
The preceding questions (and other) will be discussed in more detail with reference to the 
ITC 1839 case and other relevant literatures. 
 
3.5.1 Actually incurred  
Court cases discussed (also refer to 2.2) will be referred to and other relevant court cases 
will also be briefly discussed in this section. 
 
What can be derived from the Port Elizabeth Tramway and Caltex Oil case is that ‗actually 
incurred‘ qualifies the expenditure to be due and payable. However, even when 
expenditure is incurred within a particular assessment year, the payment can be made in a 
subsequent year.  
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As stated in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, ‗expenditure involves losses of floating 
capital employed in the trade which produces the income‘. On that basis, whether the loss 
or outgoing is voluntary or involuntary is of no consequence.  
 
The word ‗incurred‘ does not merely mean ‗paid‘. As long as the liability to pay an 
expense has been incurred, it is deductible. Therefore a trader may at the end of the year of 
assessment owe money for stocks bought by him or for services rendered to him during the 
course of the year. He has not ‗paid‘ anything on account of those liabilities, but they have 
been ‗incurred‘ and are deductible. Actual payment is therefore not essential for the 
deduction of expenditure; the Act merely requires that it must have been ‗incurred‘  
(De Koker, 2010: ¶ 7.5).  
 
It has been held that the word ‗incurred‘ means either ‗paid‘ or ‗becoming liable for‘16. 
 
As for the word ‗actually‘, it has been held that it does not add anything to the ‗plain and 
ordinary meaning‘ of the word incurred17. 
 
But in the Golden Dumps case18 this approach was criticized, on the basis that to regard the 
word ‗actually‘ as being superfluous and to ignore it would be contrary to the principle of 
statutory construction that a meaning should be given to every word. The word could not 
have been used by the legislature through inadvertence or error. Its dictionary meaning is 
‗in act or fact; really‘. And an unreported Australian decision suggests that it means 
‗ascertained‘, ‗encountered‘, ‗run into‘, ‗fallen upon‘ and not merely ‗impending, 
threatened, or expected‘. In other words, or so it would appear from the line of the court‘s 
reasoning, the liability under consideration must not be contingent (De Koker 2010: ¶ 7.5). 
 
However, section 11(a) applies the complex phrase ‗expenditure and losses‘. A ‗loss‘ may 
be suffered without being the cause of an obligation owed by the taxpayer to a third party, 
e.g. where a trader‘s stock is stolen by employees. A liability or obligation will usually not 
need to be represented by the amount of a liability owed by the taxpayer to a third party.  
 
                                                 
16
 ITC 542 (1942) 13 SATC 116 at 118 
17
 ITC 1117 (1968) 30 SATC 130 at 131 
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Christie (2001:552) states that set-off may be regarded as a form of payment, and even as 
the equivalent of payment in cash. A party is excused from performing if the other party 
owes him a debt that admits of set-off against the first party‘s debt. For set-off to operate 
the following requirements must be satisfied: 
 
 The parties must be indebted to each other and each of them must owe and be owed 
in the same capacity. So, for example, set-off does not operate if A owes B and B 
owes C, or if A owes B in B‘s representative capacity (eg, as trustee, liquidator, or 
guardian) and B owes A in A‘s personal capacity. 
 The debts must be of the same kind. A money debt, for example, cannot be set off 
against a claim for delivery of property. 
 The debts must be due and enforceable. Set-off does not operate if, for instance, one 
of the debts is subject to a suspensive condition or is only enforceable at a future 
date. 
In Asco Carbon Dioxide Ltd v Lahner 2005 (3) SA 123 (N), A owed L a debt in respect 
of a cost order and L was indebted to A in terms of suretyship undertaking. The court 
held that, as L‘s suretyship debt would become due and enforceable only once 
excussion of the principal debtor had taken place (which had not occurred), the two 
debts were not extinguished by set-off. A, accordingly, could not prevent L from 
executing on the costs order. 
 The debts must be liquidated, i.e., fixed by agreement or by law or for amounts 
which are capable of being easily and promptly proved. So, a claim for damages 
(being generally unliquidated) is ordinarily not susceptible of set-off. 
 
Given the above requirements, set-off operates automatically: it does not have to be raised 
or invoked by one of the parties. If the debts are for the same amount, set-off extinguishes 
both of them. If the debts are for different sums, the greater is reduced by the amount of the 
smaller which is extinguished (Sharrock, 2007:525).  
 
The principle that set-off operates automatically was settled by Innes CJ, giving the 
judgement of the Appellate Division (now called Supreme Court of Appeal) in  




The doctrine of set-off with us is not derived from statute and regulated by rule of court, 
as in England. It is a recognised principle of our common law. When two parties are 
mutually indebted to each other, both debts being liquidated and fully due, then the 
doctrine of compensation come into operation. The one debt extinguished the other pro 
tanto as effectually as if payment had been made. Should one of the creditors seek 
thereafter to enforce his claim, the defendant would have to set up the defence of 
compensation by bringing the facts to notice of the Court – as indeed the defence of 
payment would also have to be pleaded and proved. But, compensation once 
established, the claim would be regarded as extinguished from the moment the mutual 
debts were in existence together.  
(Christie, 2001:553) 
 
3.5.3 The patrimony concern 
The learn judge suggested that because the sale was for the net amount and that the 
provision concerned was contingent, it could not be said that an expense had been actually 
incurred – there was, said the judge, no reduction of the seller‘s patrimony (wealth) when 
he was relieved of an uncertain future liability. With respect, it seems that the correct view 
should have been that because the cost to the purchaser of taking over the provisions had 
been set off against the amount owing for the assets (which the judge accepted for 
purposes of argument), an expense (or possible loss) had indeed been incurred. 
‗Patrimony‘ has nothing to do with the issue (Clegg, 2010a:19). 
 
3.5.4 Nature of the expense 
After dealing with the above, it is now necessary to turn to the deductibility of the expense. 
In order for the expenditure to be deductible in terms of section 11(a), it must have been 
incurred ‗in the production of income‘ and not be ‗of a capital nature‘.  Also, deductibility 
must not be prohibited by any of the provisions of section 23.   
 
Section 23(e), 23(f) and 23(g) of the Act were called forth by the respondent. As noted by 
the judge, the matter does not involve the carrying of income to a reserve fund or 
capitalisation of income. Thus, section 23(e), which prohibits a deduction in respect of 
‗income carried to any reserve fund or capitalised in any way‘, is not relevant.   
 
Section 23(g) is a general prohibition section which provides negatively for what may not 




The taxpayer had given up the portion of the purchase price representing the liabilities in 
consideration for the purchaser assuming those liabilities and therefore this portion of the 
purchase price represented ‗expenditure…incurred‘ within the meaning of section 11(a) of 
the Act. Further it was also submitted by the appellant that expenditure incurred by the 
taxpayer to rid itself of the anticipated or contingent revenue expense was generally itself 
of a revenue nature (at page 62).  
 
Following the above, the next step should be to establish the nature of expenditure incurred 
by a taxpayer to rid himself from liabilities already undertook but still contingent. It is 
submitted (as gathered from the case on page 70) that there is relatively little South African 
authority directly in point and that it could be useful (and necessary) to review English and 
Australian authority. Note that the judge submitted (at page 71) that: 
 
These (English and Australian) cases are interesting but, for reasons which, we trust, 
will become clear a little further on, quite unhelpful for the appellant. They all dealt 
with ‗lump sum‘ deductions. Whether payments are for a ‗lump sum‘ or even, as was 
artfully argued, ‗compressed expenditure‘ does not alter or even answer the questions 
that have necessarily been posed in this case such as whether or not the relevant amount 
constitutes ‗expenditure‘; whether it was actually incurred; whether it was incurred in 
the production of income; whether it was of a capital nature; whether it was incurred for 
the purposes of trade; and whether or not it was capitalised in any way. The court 
accepts, however, the thrust of Mr Rogers‘s argument that while ‗lump sum‘ payments 
may generally, at first blush, have a ‗forbidden‘ character when it comes to tax-
deductibility, this is not necessarily the case. It will, no doubt, be the appellant‘s lament 
that this well-prepared argument does not assist it in this case. It should be added that, at 
no stage was the court, in the slightest way beguiled, led astray, disturbed or perturbed 
by the ‗lump sum‘ character of the relevant amount. 
 
Selected English and Australian authority, mentioned by the judge in ITC 1839 
 (at page 70), will be discussed to prove that the abovementioned extract is, with respect, 







English case law 
In the Smith v Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales19 case a 
lump sum gratuity paid to a retiring employee was held to be deductible.  The lump sum 
payment was not in exchange of an existing pension liability but a gratuitous recognition 
for past service (though in accordance with the expectation of employees).  
 
The case of Hancock v General Reversionary & Investment Co Ltd20 a certain employee 
had retired in 1905.  In accordance with the employer‘s usual practice he was awarded an 
annual pension.  In 1913 the pension was exchanged by the purchase by the employer of an 
annuity for the retiree for a lump sum. 
 
Lush J held that the lump sum expenditure was not of a capital nature and was thus 
deductible.  He referred to the once-for-all test and said: 
 
[A]pplying that test I think that it necessarily follows, on the facts found by the 
Commissioners, that the [lump sum] should be treated, as the pension was treated, as an 
ordinary business expense and that the deduction should be allowed.  It is the pension in 
another form; it is actuarially equivalent in value and it is identical in character.  It was 
paid to meet a continuing demand which was itself an ordinary business expense as the 
surveyor has treated it... It seems to me as impossible to hold that the fact that a lump 
sum was paid instead of a recurring series of annual payments alters the character of the 
expenditure as it would be to hold that, if an employer made a voluntary arrangement 
with his servant to pay the servant a year‘s salary in advance instead of paying each 
year‘s salary as it fell due, he would be making a capital outlay. 
 
Accordingly, in the Hancock case, the liability which the employer was relieved from by a 
lump sum was contingent (i.e. the employee‘s life expectancy). It should be noted that the 
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 1914 3 KB 675 
20
 1919 1 KB 25 
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A further case mentioned was Rowntree & Co Ltd v Curtis21: 
In the Rowntree case the company in the ordinary course provided relief to employees in 
circumstances of illness and hardship.  The company, after an exceptional flourishing year, 
decided to form a trust and allocated a lump sum to the trustees, on the basis that the trust 
income would be used to pay these expenses by way of payments to employees in agony.  
The court held on appeal that the lump sum settlement was not deductible.  Pollock MR 
said that he had found the case a difficult one.  Although on the facts the payments to 
suffering employees were a continuous demand on the company‘s business, he held that 
the lump sum was a capital expense.  In distinguishing Hancock’s case he emphasised that 
no actuarial calculation of the future demand was possible or had been undertaken.  There 
was no way of saying whether the lump sum would meet the demand or be needed in full.  
It was thus ‗impossible to say that this was invalidity insurance in another form‘  
(at page 339).  
Pollock MR also counterpointed the Rowntree case with another case ‗in which 
expenditure is made on business grounds of a sum, apparently a capital sum, but which 
really comprises and compresses what is an annual charge‘.   He submitted, in general  
(at page 336): 
Where you find that there is a continuous business demand, you may, on business principles, 
commute that continuous demand and on prudent grounds make a payment which covers more 
than the particular year, and you may be able to show that that sum has been spent in order to 
obviate the continuous business demand and, hence, that it is a sum wholly and exclusively laid 
out in the earning of the profits. 
Warrington J agreed with the Pollock MR‘s reasoning (at page 343): 
The expenditure which has been made is not expenditure of money merely for the purpose of 
meeting the demand in the particular year – that is quite plain – but it is intended to meet the 
expenditure for an indefinite number of years, and expenditure of an indefinite and incalculable 
amount. There are no actuarial principles by which the amount could be ascertained or 
computed.  It is absolutely uncertain what amount the company will have to meet. 
                                                 
21
 1925 1 KB 328 CA 
 
 26 
This Rowntree case is quite clearly distinguishable from the ITC 1839 set of facts. The 
statement that ‗No actuarial calculation of the future demand was possible or had been 
undertaken’ is not applicable to ITC 1839. An amount has been calculated (relating to all 
three contingencies) and the services were already rendered (relating to the bonus and post 
employment benefits contingency) during the normal course of business  
The next case selected from the list mentioned in ITC 1839 is  
British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd v Atherton22: 
A company formed a pension fund for its employees by way of a trust.  It allocated a lump 
sum as the basis of the fund to finance the past service benefits of current employees. 
Future service benefits were to be met by recurring contributions from employees and also 
from the company.  The issue at hand was if the current contributions by the company 
were deductible. 
At first the judge submitted that contributions were deductible and this submission was 
overturned by three judges in the Court of Appeal.  On further appeal to the House of 
Lords it was held by a majority (three against two) that the lump sum was of a capital 
nature and not deductible.  
Viscount Cave submitted that ‗when expenditure is made, not only once and for all, but 
with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a 
trade, I think that there is very good reason (in the absence of special circumstances 
leading to an opposite conclusion) for treating such expenditure as properly attributable not 
to revenue but to capital‘ (at page 213). Viscount Cave, in his concluding comments on the 
nature of the lump sum payment, submitted (at page 214): 
[I]t is a fair inference from the terms of the deed and from the Commissioners‘ findings that 
without this contribution the fund might not have come into existence at all.  The object and 
effect of the payment of this large sum was to enable the company to establish the pension fund 
and to offer to all its existing and future employees a sure provision for their old age, and so to 
obtain for the company the substantial and lasting advantage of being in a position throughout 
its business life to secure and retain the services of a contented and efficient staff.  I am 
satisfied on full consideration that the payment was in the nature of capital expenditure... 
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Lord Carson stated, in his dissenting judgement (at page 225): 
It is clear from the terms of the trust deed, as already pointed out, that in no sense was the sum 
an investment, that it would be eventually exhausted in payment of the pensions, and that in the 
event of a winding-up of the company it could never form any part of the assets of the 
company.  I cannot, under these circumstances, conceive any system of commercial 
accountancy under which this sum could ever appear in the capital accounts of the company.  
Nor is it capital withdrawn from the business, as it was admittedly paid out of the earnings of 
the year.  It is not disputed that an annual sum contributed to the pension fund on an actuarial 
basis for the purposes of making the fund solvent for paying the pensions of the older members 
of the staff would be a proper deduction in arriving at the balance of profits and gains, it would 
be an ordinary business expense...Why, therefore, should the payment of the sum in question, 
which by an actuarial calculation represents the sum equal to the annual payments which would 
be necessary, not be considered as in the same position? 
Lord Blanesburgh in his dissent submitted that (at page 229): 
[The lump sum] was a payment by the company on account of each of these employees of a 
sum which... comprised and compressed a series of prior annual payments on his account.  It 
was a sum, and this is perhaps in the present connection its most important characteristic, 
actuarially so adjusted in amount that when the last of the existing staff, participant to the fund, 
on whose account it had been paid died or fell out of benefit no part of it or of any accretion to 
it would remain in the hands of the trustees.  It would then have been entirely exhausted in 
providing the covenanted benefits for the participants on whose account it was paid. 
With reference to the above it is clear that Viscount Cave and Lord Buckmaster thought 
the Hancock case was correct but distinguishable (at pages 213 and 224).  Lord Atkinson 
did not agree with Hancock’s case (at pages 222-223) still; both dissenting judges were of 
the opinion that Hancock’s case was not only correct but applicable to the facts of the case 
(at pages 225-226 and 232-233).     
Anglo-Persian Oil Co Ltd v Dale23 was a case where a company, which was required under 
a long term contract to pay an agent annual amounts, negotiated the early termination of 
the contract by paying the agent a lump sum.  The full bench held that the lump sum 
payment was deductible.  It was submitted that the expenditure had not brought into 
existence any permanent fund – distinguishable from the Atherton case.   
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The company had merely paid the lump sum in order to conduct its business in what it 
thought would be a more efficient manner (at page 142).  If a contract was onerous simply 
because it entailed a heavy drain on the company‘s annual revenue, the company did not 
secure an enduring benefit by getting rid of the contract (at page 147).   
In Heather v P-E Consulting Group Ltd24, a company which had formed a share trust for 
employees were required to pay 10% of its profits to the trust each year.  Once more the 
question was whether these annual payments were deductible:   
Lord Denning submitted: ‗Different minds may come to different conclusions with equal 
propriety. It is like the border between day and night, or between red and orange‘ (12f).  
Lord Denning said that the annual payments were more similar to the recurrent payments 
in the Atherton case than the lump sum payment which had been disallowed in the 
Atherton case.   
Buckley LJ said that he did not find it easy to put his finger on any passage in the majority 
judgments in the Atherton case which clearly stated what the difference was (at 15d).  He 
suggested the following possible distinction (at 15g-h): 
The establishment of such a fund was a condition precedent to the establishment of the 
contributory scheme.  In order to open the way to the establishment of the scheme, the 
company itself provided the fund.  That is what is called the nucleus fund.  As expenditure 
distinct from the company‘s subsequent contributions, it was a once-for-all expenditure, which 
made it possible for the company to embark on a scheme which would benefit its commercial 
activity.  It might perhaps in fanciful language be said to have prepared the ground or provided 
the site on which the scheme itself should be erected.  Seen in this light, the initial payment can 
perhaps justifiably be viewed as having a different character and being made with a different 
object from the company‘s subsequent annual contributions. 
In Vodafone Cellular Ltd v G. Shaw (HM’s Inspector of Taxes)25 the English Court of 
Appeal had to mull over a case where the taxpayer had paid $30 million to another party 
(Millicom) in order to relieve itself of a onerous 15-year agreement in terms whereof the 
taxpayer had to make annual fee payments to Millicom for licence rights and know-how: 
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It was held that the expenditure was made for purposes of trade and was not of a capital 
nature. 
Millett LJ submitted the following: 
Two matters are of particular importance: the nature of the payment; and the nature of the 
advantage obtained by the payment. The fact that the payment is a lump sum payment is 
relevant but not determinative.  In a case such as the present, where the payment is made in 
order to get rid of a liability, a useful starting point is to inquire into the nature of the liability 
which is brought to an end by the payment.  Where a lump sum payment is made in order to 
commute or extinguish a contractual obligation to make recurring revenue payments then the 
payment is prima facie a revenue payment. 
Thus, comparable to the other cases, the liability was contingent (depending on a future 
result) with regards to the sums payable (the fee to Millicom was profit-based). 
Australian case law 
In Spotlight Stores Pty Ltd v CoT26 the employer had settled $15 million on trustees as a 
fund out of which future annual bonuses were to be paid to employees.  Although the 
employer had a long-standing practice of paying annual bonuses, the trust was established 
as part of a revised bonus scheme.  The initial contribution of $15 million was an estimate 
of the bonuses that would become payable under the new scheme over the first five years.  
The trust deed stated that the employer would continue to make contributions annually.  
The benefits achieved by the establishment of the new scheme were improved staff 
retention, morale, productivity and loyalty. 
The court held that the payment was not of a capital nature and was thus deductible. 
Although it was found that the payment was deductible, the court decided that the payment 
was part of a tax avoidance scheme – not relevant with regards to the facts of ITC 1839. 
It was stated by the court that the answer to the capital/revenue question depends on what 
the expenditure is calculated to effect from a practical and business point of view, rather 
than upon the juristic classification of the legal rights (if any) secured, employed or 
                                                 
26 2004 FCA 650 
 
 30 
exhausted in the process.  With regards to the latter principles the court concluded that by 
the $15 million contribution was of a revenue nature.  It was effectively a prepayment of 
bonuses expected to become payable over the next five years, which was the period over 
which the advantage of enhanced profitability in consequence of improved staff morale 
and loyalty was expected to be enjoyed (at paragraphs 53-55). 
The court quoted the Hancock case in support of the conclusion that the prepayment of 
future bonuses in a lump sum did not result in the contribution being on capital account.  
The court distinguished the Atherton case by saying that whereas the lump sum 
contribution in that case had been to provide the nucleus of a fund expected to endure for 
the life of the company, the contribution in the Spotlight case was to enable bonuses to be 
paid over the ensuing five years and would be progressively diminished over that period.  
The lump sum was in substitution of the annual contributions Spotlight would otherwise 
have had to make.  The trust had to be ‗refilled‘ by further contributions no and again.  The 
contribution was made to meet a continuous demand which the company had to meet out 
of the returns of trade and ‗was enduring only to the extent that for a good number of years 
it were expected to relieve Spotlight of a revenue payment‘ (at paragraph 71).   
The Spotlight case was taken on appeal, and is reported as Pridecraft Pty Ltd v CoT; CoT v 
Spotlight Stores Pty Ltd27.  The Full Court upheld the lower court‘s decision, including 
specifically the decision on the capital/revenue question (at paragraphs 95-100).  The Full 
Court noted, with reference to the decision of the House of Lords in the Atherton case, that 
the House had been divided on the outcome.  The Full Court observed that it was perhaps 
debatable whether it was appropriate for the majority in the Atherton case to have 
characterised the advantage obtained from the contribution to the pension fund as enduring 
for the benefit of trade. 
In a South African case, SIR v John Cullum Construction Co (Pty) Ltd28 the court 
emphasised that the payment was not made to acquire, enhance or preserve a capital asset 
(at 714f).   
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In ITC 1839, as noted, the contingent liabilities (post employment benefits, bonus/leave 
payments and repairs and maintenance of capital assets) which the taxpayer was relieved 
from were revenue expenses. Consequently, if one follows the general principle in all the 
abovementioned cases, it can be cogently argued that the expenditure incurred by the 
taxpayer to relieve itself from the contingent liabilities was itself of a revenue nature.   
Also, in the ITC 1839 case no asset was brought into existence in consequence of the 
expenditure.  It has been submitted in various cases, e.g. in George Forest Timber Co Ltd29, 
CoT v Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd30, ITC 124131 and ITC 126732 that 
expenditure not made in order to create an income-producing concern or to establish or 
enhance an income-earning structure is not capital in nature and therefore deductible.  
Hence, with respect, the principle in the above cases was not only primarily to prove that 
the lump sum has a ‗forbidden‘ character. The focus is clearly on the capital and revenue 
nature distinction. It is therefore submitted that the same principle can be applied in 
concluding that the expenditure that the taxpayer ‗incurred‘ in ITC 1839 was in the 
production of income and for purposes of trade.   
 
It is noted that the liabilities, although contingent as at 1 March 2004, were raised during 
the seller‘s normal course of business. If a taxpayer sells his business, excluding his 
liabilities, he will receive a higher price for the business. The additional amount received 
would then be used to meet the liabilities when they become unconditional. But, when the 
time comes, the taxpayer will no longer be trading and the expenditure will therefore not 
be incurred in the production of income. Although he has ceased trading activities, it is not  
logical to argue that the liabilities, raised during his normal course of business while he 
was trading, would not be deductable even though he ceased to trade. 
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As learned from ITC 102933, the courts has demonstrated that in assessing whether the 
requirements of section 11(a) and section 23(g) are met, one must look to the taxpayer‘s 
purpose at the time he undertook the commitment: 
if expenditure is deductible by a taxpayer while he carries on business, the fact that he ceases to 
carry on that business does not render such expenditure non-deductible provided that it arises 
out of the taxpayer‘s activities prior to the cessation of his business operations. 
The above case was taken on appeal, and is reported as CoT v Cathcart34. It did not seem 
that the court oppose the judgement that a deduction could be made in respect of a 
contingent liability which realised after the taxpayer had ceased trading. The appeal 
succeeded on the grounds that the taxpayer failed to prove that he had in fact been under an 
obligation to pay.   
It is also submitted that (at 510D-F): 
It does not seem to me, therefore, that it is a correct approach to look solely to the period when 
the event which gives rise to the expenditure occurs in order to determine whether it is 
expenditure solely and exclusively made in the production of income or for the purposes of 
trade. If the risk of incurring the particular type of expenditure in question is deliberately 
undertaken by contract in order to earn the income, then, when that risk is fulfilled and the 
expenditure is in fact incurred, it is so closely connected with the performance of the business 
operation that it would be proper, natural or reasonable to regard it as part of the cost of 
performing the operation. It seems to me that such expenditure is properly deductible in terms 
of sec. 13(2)(a). 
ITC 72935 is another case dealing with a business that ceases trading.  In this case three 
individuals had conducted trade in partnership.  During the time that the business was 
carried on the partners undertook to pay periodic pensions to certain retired employees.  
Upon the sale of the partnership‘s business, the obligation to pay the pensions was not 
taken over by the purchaser.  In a year subsequent to the year of the sale, one of the 
partners claimed a tax deduction for pension payments made to former employees.  The 
Commissioner refused the deduction on the basis that the partnership had ceased trading 
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and that the expense was thus not incurred wholly and exclusively for purposes of trade (in 
accordance with the requirement then set in section 12(g) of Act 31 of 1941). 
It was submitted that (at page 96): 
I think the argument overlooks that fact that section 12(g) does not only refer to monies 
expended but also monies laid out.  When originally the obligation was undertaken to pay the 
pensions it was undertaken for the purpose of trade.  An employer, as part of the wages to an 
employee, gives him an undertaking that when he retires he will be paid a pension.  That 
undertaking amounts to a laying out of monies for the purpose of trade.  Nor does paragraph 
(g) state that the monies must be laid out or expended for the purpose of trade during the year 
for which the assessment is being made.  The paragraph is in wide terms and only requires that 
the payment must be one which was for the purposes of trade, so that once it is established that 
the obligation to make the payment was for the purpose of trade, then when that obligation is 
discharged it remains a payment for the purposes of trade. 
In ITC162736 was a case dealing with ongoing interest payments incurred by a taxpayer 
after the venture for which the money had been borrowed had failed. In that case the 
taxpayer had entered remunerated employment, succeeding to his venture failing, and the 
interest was held to be deductible against the income derived from his employment.  
The Court also said that there was much to be said for the view that trading only ceases 
when all debts of the business have been paid and quoted English authority. 
Lastly, in Tornado Transport (Edms) Bpk v KBI37 a payment was made by the taxpayer to a 
surety who had paid on behalf of the principal debtor and had exercised his right of 
recourse against the taxpayer.  The Court held (at page 378 - 379) that when an assessment 
is made of closeness of connection between the expense (the payment to the surety) and 
the cost of performing the taxpayer‘s transport business, the surety payment took on the 
characteristics of the underlying expense (the payments for fuel) that gave rise to the 
payment made by the surety on behalf of the taxpayer. With regards to the timing of the 
expense, the court held that it was during the year that the payment was made to the surety, 
and not in another period as contented by the Commissioner, during which the underlying 
expense was incurred. 
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It seems that from the ‗actually incurred‘ discussion the actual payment is not essential for 
the deduction of expenditure; the Act merely requires that it must have been ‗incurred‘.  
 
The next question therefore is whether an expense has indeed been incurred. It is submitted 
that set-off may be regarded as a form of payment and even as the equivalent of payment in 
cash. It is also not required for the agreement to provide for sett-off for the amounts 
reciprocally owed.  
 
The terms of the agreement and the method for the discharge (set-off) of the purchase price 
thus gave rise to expenditure in the hands of the appellant in the amount of the liabilities. 
   
The seller‘s obligation to pay to the purchaser the amount of the contingent liabilities 
became unconditional on 1 March 2004, and it actually paid the amount on 1 March 2004 
by way of set-off against the purchase price owed to it by the purchaser. As gathered from 
principles in various judgements, the potential cessation of the taxpayer‘s trade after  
1 March 2004 does not play an influence.  
 
Further, the expense did not establish an ‗income-producing machine‘, it did not result in 
the acquisition of an income producing machine and it did not add to any existing income-
producing machine. It is a recurring expense which forms part of the cost of performing 
income-earning operations and is not part of the cost of acquiring an income-producing 
concern. It could also be said that a payment to the purchaser (i.e. the set-off) may be 
compared with paying an insurance premium to a third party. 
 
3.6 Respondent - introduction 
The respondent disallowed the expenditure on the grounds that they did not constitute 
expenditure; they do not constitute expenditure actually incurred; they did not constitute 
expenditure incurred in the production of income; if they were expenditures, they were of a 
capital nature; if they were expenditures, they were not incurred for the purposes of trade; 





3.7 Arguments in favour of the respondent 
This chapter, in a concise manner, sets out to identify the contentions that the respondent 
applied in its head of arguments. The most important principles which have arisen during 
the course of the ITC 1839 case will be discussed below. 
 
3.7.1 Did not constitute expenditure nor actually incurred  
It has been submitted that the underlying expenditure relating to the relevant amount was 
part of the liabilities reflected in the accounting records of the appellant. The liabilities 
constituting the relevant amount in issue had not come into existence on 1 March 2004 and 
they were conditional and it was clear that until such liabilities became unconditional they 
did not constitute ‗incurred expenditure‘. It was submitted that the expenditure on the 
relevant amount could only have been incurred if one accepts construction of events that 
the appellant ‗paid‘ the respondent R311 692 717 in order to be relieved of its (the 
appellant‘s) liabilities (at page 71).  
In other words, because the sale was for the net amount and the provision concerned was 
contingent, it could not be said that an expense had been actually incurred. The judge was 
also of the opinion that there was no reduction of the seller‘s patrimony (wealth) when he 
was relieved of the uncertain future liability (refer 3.5.3 for a further discussion). 
The court did not dwell on this aspect since it was of the view that the appellant faces more 
essential difficulties (at page 72). 
 
3.7.2 Not expenditure in the production of income  
It was stated in the ITC 1839 case that this question is closely related to the above 
mentioned discussion. It only arises if one accepts that the appellant ‗paid‘ the amount in 
order to be relieved of its liabilities. In other words, to generate income not of  
R800 million but of some R1.1 billion. The judge also said that if one reads the definition 
of ‗income‘ together with that of ‗gross income‘ in the Act, it is clear that ‗income‘ 
excludes ‗receipts or accruals of capital nature‘ (at page 72). 
 
Further it was submitted that the ‗expenditure incurred‘ was not in the production of 
‗income‘ from the disposal but in the production of income previously earned by the 
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appellant during the period that it traded prior to selling the business. Accordingly, so this 
argument went, the ‗notional agreement expenditure‘ compromising the amount ‗paid‘ to 
the purchaser in order for the latter to assume the appellant‘s contingent liabilities was 
incurred on payment and therefore had converted uncontingent expenditure , i.e. the 
‗underlying expenditure‘ which was conceded as contingent expenditure, into 
uncontingent, deductible expenditure. It was argued that the difficulty with this argument 
was that the ‗notional agreement expenditure‘ did not produce ‗income‘ arising from the 
sale of the business. It was said that the ‗payment‘, if there ever was a payment, was to 
induce the purchaser to assume the liabilities. Had the appellant not sold its business and 
settled its liabilities in the normal course of trading, it would be arguable that the 
expenditure would be incurred in the production of income. The ‗notional agreement 
expenditure‘ was, however, clearly ‗incurred‘ in order to induce the purchaser to assume 
the liabilities, rather than incurred in the production of income prior to the sale of the 
business (at page 72) 
 
Clegg (2010a:20) proposes: 
The proper enquiry is to ask why it was that the seller found himself in the position of 
needing to pay the purchaser to take over the contingent liability.  
 
He said the answer to that is twofold: 
 First, because he had employed certain individuals who had rendered services and 
earned him income in prior years and for which, subject to a contingency as to their 
continued loyalty for a further period, he would be obliged to pay them already 
determined amount.  
 Secondly, as identified by the judge, that in order to sell his business as a going 
concern, he needed to ensure that the purchaser could take over those employees, 
together with their contingent rights to payment of a bonus, and would not be out of 
pocket in so doing. 
 
There were thus two causative factors and the question is, which is the causa causans? 
Is the sale of the business the dominant causative factor, relegating the prior services to a 
mere sine qua non, or were the prior services rendered by the employees the real reason the 




In CIR v Shell Southern Africa Pension Fund the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
(now the Supreme Court of Appeal) considered the position of the dependant of a deceased 
employee, to whom an amount had been paid by the deceased‘s pension fund. The question 
was whether the amount has been received by the independent by virtue of the death of the 
employee or exercise of discretion of the fund‘s trustees to select the beneficiary? 
 
In that case, the court found that the real cause of the dependant receiving the amount was 
the decision of the trustees and as this was not an event which triggered a ‗gross income‘ 
consequence in terms of the Act, it fell outside the provisions of the law. In the case of the 
bonus provision payment, it seems that it can be cogently argued that the real and 
fundamental reason for the payment is the undertaking by the seller to their employees in 
terms of his contracts of employment and that the sale of the business does no more than 
crystallise the timing of the incurral.  
 
This argument may well be stronger if the payment of the contingent bonuses were made 
not to the purchaser of the business but to the employees themselves. But absent that 
variation it is difficult to deny the reality that the incurral event on the facts of the case, 
that is the payment to the purchaser, was timed and took place, not to recompense the 
employees but to enable the sale of business. In my view this relegates the contracts of 
employment to status of sine qua non, of relevance only to the quantum of the payment 
and not the cause.   
 
3.7.3 Expenditure of a capital nature  
It was argued in ITC 1839 that the usual test to determine the nature of expenditure, i.e. 
capital or revenue, is to establish whether the expenditure is more closely connected with 
the income earnings operations, i.e. revenue expenditure or income earning structure 
(capital expenditure). It was submitted that as the sale of business would, by its very 
nature, cause a cessation of trading, the appellant had been unable successfully to argue 
that the expenditure incurred in relation to the sale would be more closely connected to its 






3.7.4 Expenditure not for the purpose of trade  
The judge stated (at page 73) that is has been observed that section 23(g) of the Act 
disallows deductions for moneys which were not laid out or expended for the purpose of 
trade. This means, inter alia, that the expenditure must have been incurred for the purposes 
of or in connection with its profit making activities (De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue38; Burgess v Commissioner for Inland Revenue39). 
 
It was further said (at page 73) that by reason of the definition of ‗income‘ and ‗gross 
income‘ in section 1 of the Act, this must necessarily mean profit derived from the income 
generating activities of the taxpayer. The transaction or transactions in question were 
undertaken with a view to enabling the appellant to sell its business to the purchaser as a 
going concern and, in particular, for the purpose of bringing and end to the appellant‘s 
trading activities.  
 
It was submitted that there can be no question that the appellant did not pay the relevant 
amount prior to the happening of the event which brought about the cessation of its trading 
activities. The expenditure, if such it was, was not laid out or expended for the purposes of 
appellant‘s trade. This question must also be answered in favour of the respondent. The 
court were also referred by counsel for both sides to the judgement of Labe J in the  
ITC 1627 (at page 26) wherein he supported the view that trading only ceases when all 
debts of the business have been settled. The court was aware that Labe J‘s view has not 
escaped criticism and that a different view has been taken (see for example ITC 49040) but, 
in the light of the approach which the court has taken in this matter it is unnecessary to 
decide which the better view is (at page 73). 
 
3.7.5 Section 23(e) 
The instant matter does not involve the carrying of income to a reserve fund or 
capitalisation of income. This section will therefore not be further discussed. 
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3.7.6 Section 23(f)  
Section 23(f) prohibits the deduction of any expenses incurred in respect of any amounts 
received or accrued which do not constitute income as defined in section 1 of the Act. 
Counsel for the respondent relied strongly upon the dicta of Corbett JA, as he then was, in 
the Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd41: 
 
Section 11(a) provides positively and in general terms in the case of a person deriving income 
from the carrying on of trade within the Republic, what expenditure and losses shall be allowed 
as deductions from income so derived in order to determine his taxable income. The subsection 
limits the deduction to expenditure and losses incurred in the Republic in the production of 
income, other than those of a capital nature…
42
 
Section 23 prescribes what deductions may not be made in the determination of taxable 
income. Subsection (f) and (g) represents, in a general sense, the negative counterpart of 
section 11(a) and, in determining whether a particular amount is deductible, it is generally 
appropriate to consider whether or not such deduction is permitted by section 11(a) and 




It was submitted that the court will therefore treat section 23(f) of the Act as ‗in a general 
sense, the negative counterpart‘ of the ‗in production of income‘ requirement of section 
11(a). The court referred to its conclusion with regards to ‗the notional agreement 
expenditure‘ that was clearly ‗incurred‘ in order to induce the purchaser to assume the 
liabilities, rather than incurred in the production of income prior to the sale of the business 
(at page 74).  
 
3.7.7 Section 23(g)  
It should noted that the court stated that the respondent originally relied upon only four 
grounds for disallowing the deduction of the relevant amount: (i) that it did not constitute 
expenditure actually incurred; (ii) it did not constitute expenditure in the production of 
income; (iii) it was expenditure of a capital nature and (iv) it was not incurred for the 
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purposes of trade. This point is mentioned ex abudanti cautela purely to deal with the 
potential question of there being any significance in the respondent having initially 
disallowed the deduction on certain grounds and then ‗shifting the goalposts‘. Nothing 
turns on this point as at least one of these original four grounds of the respondent in 
disallowing the deduction of the relevant amount has been upheld (at page 74). 
 
3.7.8 Conclusion 
The conclusion of the court was that the deduction of the relevant amount was not 
allowable in terms of the Act. The judgement also reflects the unanimous opinion of all the 
members of the court. 
The raison d‘êtres could be summarised as follows: 
Production of income; accepting that the expenditure was incurred, the court submitted that 
it was incurred in order to induce the purchaser to assume the liabilities, rather than 
incurred in the production of income prior to the sale of the business. 
 
Capital nature; the sale of business would affect a cessation of trade and the appellant had 
been unable to successfully argue that the expenditure incurred in relation to the sale would 
be more closely connected to its income operations.  
 
Purpose of trade; the transaction were undertaken to bring an end to the appellant‘s trading 
activities. The expenditure was therefore not laid out or expended for the purposes of 
appellant‘s trade. 
 
4 OTHER RELEVANT CONTINGENCIES NOT DISCUSSED IN ITC 1839 
The treatment of warranties, deposits/future delivery liabilities, settlement discount and 
incentive-rebate provision, and retrenchment costs during the sale of a business as a going 
concern will be briefly looked into. 
 
4.1.1 Warranties 
Assume the seller had created a reserve to meet a warranty obligation incurred on goods 




Position of the seller 
The amount transferred to the reserve fund is not deductible against the income of the 
seller. Not only is the amount not actually incurred as required under section 11(a) of the 
Act, but a deduction is also specifically prohibited by section 23(e).  
 
However, the mere fact that claims in respect of the warranty obligation have not been 
submitted to the seller before the sale of the business does not necessarily mean that no 
deduction can be claimed. In Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR it was made clear that our courts 
distinguish between (a) cases where the existence of the liability itself is conditional and 
subject to some contingency, and (b) cases where the existence of the liability itself is 
certain but its amount is uncertain and cannot be accurately determined at tax year-end. 
Where the existence of the liability itself is dependent upon a future event, then the liability 
cannot be said to have been incurred. The fact of the liability cannot be said to have been 
incurred. The fact of the liability must be absolute. It must not be conditional or subject to 
contingency. All the events giving rise to the liability must have occurred. 
 
In 2004 a specific section was introduced to deal with the incurrence and accrual of 
unquantified amounts. Section 24M will be applicable, for example, where a business is 
disposed of for a percentage of the profits of the business for the next ten years. In such 
circumstances the seller will be taxed only when the profits accrue each year and the 
purchaser can only claim a deduction if and when he or she pays over the profits. Prior to 
the introduction of the section, the nature of the payment could have been in dispute. On 
the one hand, the seller could attempt to argue that the proceeds remained of a capital 
nature, although they were determined with reference to future profits.  
 
On the other hand, two counter-arguments would be available to SARS: first, that, as the 
proceeds were determined with reference to future profits, an otherwise capital amount had 
been converted into an amount of a revenue nature and, secondly, that the future payments 
constituted annuities. As such, the profits were specifically included under paragraph (a) of 
the gross income definition in section 1 of the Act. The result leaves no room for the 
taxpayer to argue that, as the amount was of a capital nature, it should have been taxed at 
the lower rate applicable to capital gains, and not at the higher rate applicable to amounts 
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of a revenue nature. Although section 24M does not expressly regulate the nature of the 
unquantified amount, it is submitted that it does so by necessary implication. As a result, 
amounts received for the disposal of an asset retain their original nature, irrespective of the 
fact that they may have been paid in the form of an annuity. 
 
Care should also be exercised that where a seller did claim a deduction for warranty 
obligations, the purchaser should not take over the obligation to meet these obligations. If 
this does happen, a recoupment will arise in the hands of the seller under section 8(4)(m) of 
the Act. To avoid the application of section 8(4)(m), the seller should not transfer to the 
purchaser any of the warranty obligations in respect of which he claimed a deduction under 
section 11(a) unless he specifically pays the purchaser therefore. 
 
Where the seller did not claim a deduction of obligations that arise under a warranty, the 
seller should rather make a specific payment to the purchaser in return for assuming future 
contingent warranties than to accept a reduction in the purchase price as the possibility 
exists that the payment (or at least a part thereof) is deductible, whereas this is unlikely 
with a reduced purchase price.  
 
Position of the purchaser  
The purchaser should not accept an amount in return for assuming the warranty obligations 
as he will be taxed on the receipt and uncertainty exists whether he can claim a section 24C 
allowance.  
For the purchaser it is advisable to agree to a lower purchase price in return for assuming 
the liabilities. When the liabilities are honoured, the purchaser will be entitled to a 
deduction under section 11(a) if he can prove that, notwithstanding the seller receiving the 
income from the contract, it is still expenditure incurred in the production of income. 
 
4.1.2 Deposits/future delivery  
As part of the sale of a business the purchaser sometimes takes over the seller‘s liability to 
deliver goods for which an order has been placed and a deposit paid.  




Position of the seller  
Where the deposit has been received or accrued to the seller, it will be included in his or 
her gross income. However, a section 24C allowance may still be claimed against the 
amount for future cost of producing and delivering the goods. But under section 24C (3) 
the allowance will be included in gross income in the next year of assessment. In 
circumstances where the purchaser takes over the liability to deliver the goods ordered, the 
seller will no longer be able to claim a further section 24C allowance as the Commissioner 
will not be ‗satisfied that such amount will be utilized in whole or in part [by the seller] to 
finance future expenditure‘. 
  
Position of the purchaser  
If the purchaser, pursuant to the sale of the business, assumes the obligation to deliver 
goods previously ordered from the seller, without the corresponding right to the deposit 
(that is, a payment therefore by the seller) and the outstanding balance, he will not be 
entitled to claim a deduction of the expenditure incurred in fulfilling the obligation to 
deliver the goods, because that expenditure will not be incurred ‗in the production of 
income‘ as required by section 11(a).  
 
If he assumes the right to receive the balance of the purchase price as well as the obligation 
to deliver, he will, in principle, be entitled to a deduction under section 11(a). The 
Commissioner may argue that the expenditure is not in the production of income to the 
extent that it exceeds the income derived by the purchaser from the contract. If the 
purchaser can prove that the expenditure is so closely related to his income-earning 
operations, that it can be regarded as part of them, the whole of the expenditure should be 
deductible.  
 
Therefore the purchaser should, to ensure a tax effective result, not assume the obligation 








4.1.3 Settlement discount and incentive-rebate provision  
A settlement discount allows the buyer of goods to pay less than the invoiced amount if the 
buyer makes payment within a certain period of time. An incentive- rebate provision is 
based on the volume of goods purchased by the buyer. These terms and conditions are 
negotiated in advance of the purchase of goods. In terms of accounting standards, a 
provision may be recognised when an enterprise has a present obligation (legal or 
constructive) as a result of a past event and it is probable that an outflow of resources 
embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, and a reliable 
estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation.  
 
If these conditions are not met, no provision should be recognised. The settlement discount 
cannot be provided at year-end for goods sold within the specified period if payment has 
not yet been received. The seller of the goods does not have a present obligation to give 
this settlement discount, and the obligation will arise only when payment is actually 
received. When payment is received, the settlement discount may be provided for. Under 
section 11(a) of the Act, this expense is actually incurred in the production of income and 
not of a capital nature and therefore deductible for income tax purposes  
(Kroukamp 2006:26). 
 
4.1.4 Retrenchment costs 
Retrenchment costs are associated with the reorganisation, downsizing or sale of a 
business. Retrenchment costs that are not yet paid may be recorded as a provision when the 
accounting standard conditions are met. The board of directors usually makes a formal 
decision to reorganise, downsize, or sell the business and the employees are then informed 
of the decision. The employees either volunteer to resign, or a list of layoffs is set up and 
the employees are informed of the retrenchments. Retrenchment costs are usually recorded 
as a provision for accounting, although the actual payments to the employees are still 
outstanding. In terms of accounting provisions, an obligation arises for expenses pertinent 
to the sale of a business only if there is a binding sale agreement. Accounting provisions 
confirm further that the employer may provide for retrenchment costs if the employer has a 
present obligation (sales agreement), there will be an outflow of resources (actual 
payment), and a reliable estimate can be made of the amount (for example, the employees‘ 
 
 45 
retrenchment cost is calculated on years in service and formalised in the plan to sell the 
business). The retrenchment provision is deductible for income tax purposes if the 
requirements of section 11(a) of the Act are complied with. The retrenchment expenditure 
must be actually incurred, in the production of income and must not be of a capital nature. 
In ITC 1716, the question arose as to whether retrenchment payments were in the 
production of income and of a revenue nature. The expenditure was held by the court to be 
in the production of income and of a revenue nature and therefore deductible under section 
11(a) of the Act. The last requirement for section 11(a) of the Act is whether the expense is 
actually incurred. If there is an unconditional legal obligation for the retrenchment 
provision, then the expense is actually incurred and the provision is deductible for income 
tax purposes. If a provision for retrenchment costs does not fulfil the requirements of 
section 11(a) of the Act, then the provision will not be deductible for income tax purposes  
(Kroukamp 2006:40).  
 
5 THE PURCHASER’S POSITION 
From the perspective of the purchaser two main questions was not addressed by the court 
in the ITC 1839 case. On the one hand the question is asked if the receipt of the payment 
by the purchaser of the business is subject to normal tax. On the other hand it also 
ambiguous if the purchaser would qualify to deduct the expense, e.g. bonus, when paid to 
the qualifying employees.  
 
The recent article by Clegg (2010b:71-72) neatly sets out the possible position of these 
unanswered questions in ITC 1839 as follows: 
 
Accrual considerations 
There is no reason why the treatment of expenditure in the hands of one party, should have 
a bearing on the treatment of the accrual in the hands of the counterparty. But the purpose 
for which the amount accrued is intended to be employed may be very relevant in 
considering its nature. In ITC 1435, the court considered the nature of a subsidy received 
by a co-operative in relation to the future capital expenditure which would in due course 
qualify for the wear–and-tear allowance under section 11(e). The Commissioner argued 
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that the accrual constituted a recoupment of that future expense or deduction. The court 
held first that no ‗recoupment‘ could take in relation to a future expense. 
 
Then, and without discussing the matter, it accepted that the receipt was inherently capital 
in nature, because (presumably) of its close association with future acquisition of a capital 
asset and the fact that the subsidy was an isolated event divorced from the continuing 
operations of the business. 
 
What, then, was the causa for the accrual of the amount to the purchaser of the business? 
It would seem that the purchaser‘s perspective, although the quantum of the accrual is 
directly linked to the probable future payment of a bonus, the proximate cause is the 
acquisition of the business, of which the undertaking to assume the bonus liability is a 
subordinate part and hence the accrual would be capital in nature. Yet, it can also easily be 
argued that the receipt effectively subsidises the payment of what is an operating expense 
of the business and on the analogy that it is revenue in nature. 
 
Thus, in the same way that there are two competing causative factors for the incurral of the 
payment by the seller, so there are for the accrual and it is necessary to choose between 
them.In Clegg‘s view, it is likely a court would find that, on balance, the receipt or accrual 
on acquisition of a business of compensation for the expense of paying bonuses related to 
periods prior to the acquisition, is of a capital nature. 
 
Payment of bonusses 
As in the situation of the payment made by the seller of the business to the purchaser, the 
deductibility of the bonus expense by the purchaser depends upon whether it is more 
closely connected to the: 
 acquisition of the business in the first instance; or 
 the ongoing operations of the purchaser. 
On the one hand, it can be cogently argued that had the purchaser not acquired the business 
(or more properly, the assets and liabilities that comprise it) no bonus would have been 
paid by him at all and hence the bonus expenditure is capital in nature (one difficulty with 
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this argument is that taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean that there is no 
deduction for the cost of trading stock taken over in the acquisition of a business as a going 
concern – a proposition which is manifestly absurd). 
 
But on the other hand, it would seem that expenditure on the employment of staff is prima 
facie of revenue a revenue nature and the payment of a bonus in terms of the agreement of 
employment undoubtedly entered into between purchaser and staff, would bear as much 
relevance to the future retention and happiness of that staff (in the employment of the 
purchaser), as it does to their past services the seller. 
 
In CIR v New Zealand Forest Research Institute Ltd, the Privy Council considered this 
issue. Lord Hoffman said that the purchaser accepted a liability under its employment 
agreements with former employees, not merely to remunerate them for services to the 
purchaser but also to discharge obligations, either vested or contingent upon some future 
event, which were attributable to their previous service with the seller. It seems to their 
Lordships plain that, viewed in this light, the payments were capital expenditure, being part 
of what was paid for the acquisition of the assets. 
 
Lord Hoffman continued as follows: It is, of course possible to imagine a case in which the 
purchaser of a business agrees to take on the former employees on the basis that it will 
honour all accrued leave entitlements without being under any obligation to the vendor to 
do so. In such a case, the payments are simply additional, remuneration for the services 
they perform for the new employer and will be a revenue expense. But…in the present 
case…the purchaser took on the employees…not because of a contract negotiated with its 
employees but rather, because it was obliged to contract with the employees on that 
basis…as a result of the bargain contained in the transfer agreement. 
 
So this it seems is an authoritative answer. Clegg is of the opinion, with respect, that the 
reason an employer pays a bonus whose quantum is largely unrelated to the service to be 
rendered, is merely a sine qua non of that term of the agreement rather that the true 




Much will depend upon the precise circumstances of each situation but my inclination is to 
say that provided the bonus is payable to employees after a period of employment by the 
purchaser and is conditional on that employment, then it should be properly deductible in 
full, notwithstanding that the quantum is in part determined in relation to a prior period and 
a former employer. It seems to me that the purchase of the business cannot be an over-
riding factor in determining causation and that the inherent nature of the expenditure 
incurred in or resulting from that purchase, must be taken into account. 
 
Conclusion 
Clegg is therefore of the opinion that the receipt by the purchaser of the amount is not 
taxable and when the payment is made to the employees, it should (Lord Hoffman‘s views 




Section 8(4)(a) provides that when a deduction has been granted under certain sections of 
the Act and the deducted expenditure is recovered or recouped, then an amount is included 
in income as a recoupment. 
 
Section 8(4)(m) is applicable when a taxpayer has been partially or wholly relieved from a 
debt. Depending on the circumstances, section 8(4)(m) may have a fundamental impact on 
the seller's tax position if the purchaser takes over his liabilities. For section 8(4)(m) to 
apply, the seller must be relieved from the obligation to make payment of expenditure 
actually incurred and previously allowed as a tax deduction. What typically happens in a 
sale of business is that the purchaser assumes or takes over a liability of the seller for 
expenditure already deducted for tax purposes by the seller. In return, the seller either pays 
the purchaser for doing this or, more commonly, reduces the price of the assets purchased 
by the liability taken over by the purchaser. This may be done with or without the go-ahead 
of the creditor. Although the seller may not be released by the creditor, he nonetheless 
discharges the obligation to pay the expenditure by paying the purchaser to assume the 
obligation to pay the creditor (as in ITC 1839). Accordingly section 8(4)(m) does not apply 




It would seem that section 8(4)(m) may raise a concern if there is simply a net purchase 
price payable for the business, and no clear understanding exists that a consideration is 
paid or accounted for taking over the liability. 
 
7 WORDING OF CONTRACTS  
In the case of each sale of a business it is essential to analyse the agreement and to 
determine in substance what amounts are to be paid by the purchaser and receivable by the 
seller with regards to each of the assets making up the business.  
 
Kroukamp (2006:33-39) submitted the following in her unpublished work on contingent 
liabilities:  
One of the major considerations in structuring a sales transaction is the tax consequences to 
both the Seller and the Buyer. Like other terms of the agreement, what may be good for the 
Buyer, may not necessarily be good for the Seller, or vice versa. From a tax standpoint, the 
best strategy is to minimize the total taxes paid on the transaction, taking into consideration 
what the seller‘s taxes may be now and what the Buyer will ultimately have to pay. 
 
Consideration  
The consideration for the purchase of the net asset value should always form part of the 
agreement. In CIR v Niko, it was held that the purchase price in a sale of business 
agreement must be allocated to the different assets; otherwise the Commissioner may 
allocate the purchase price to the different assets, a situation that can create problems for 
the seller and the buyer. The allocation made by the seller should be fair and reasonable 
and capable of being defended.  
Inclusion of the description and amounts of the assets and liabilities of the companies 
involved in the sale agreement is mandatory when a company listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange is involved in selling or transferring its assets and liabilities.  
The writer identified two options for the transfer of accounting provisions and one option 
for not transferring the accounting provisions from the seller to the buyer during the sale of 




Option 1 – seller pays the buyer for taking over the liabilities  
The sales agreement often provides only that the seller‘s assets and liabilities are taken 
over by the buyer and therefore the net amount is also the purchase price. The agreement 
often does not specify whether the assets will be paid for by the buyer or whether the 
liabilities will be paid by the seller. 
 
The option is then for the buyer to pay the seller for the assets at market value and the 
seller to pay the buyer for taking over the liabilities, which includes the accounting 
provisions. The reasoning for this option is the possibility that the seller may deduct the 
payment for the liabilities (including the accounting provisions) as expenditure for income 
tax purposes. The writer is of the opinion that when payment was made by the seller to the 
buyer for taking over accounting provisions, the requirements of section 11(a) of the Act 
must be complied with by the seller for the seller to be entitled to a deduction. 
  
The buyer would be taxed on these amounts received for taking over the liabilities. The 
payment would be included in the buyer‘s gross income.  
 
A buyer who takes over a seller‘s liabilities, by receiving a payment for taking over the 
liabilities, could be entitled to claim a deduction when the liabilities and accounting 
provisions can fulfil the requirements of section 11(a) of the Act and that is if the 
expenditure is actually incurred, in the production of income and not of a capital nature. 
There can definitely be an argument for the tax deductibility of the accounting provisions 
and that is that the buyer took over the assets and liabilities and therefore the payment of 
the accounting provision (if not capital in nature) could be deductible for income tax 
purposes because it is closely linked to the business operation that was taken over.  
 
Solomon SC argued in his opinion that the payment made by the seller is not incurred in 
the production of income. The payment is made to relieve the seller of future liabilities and 
not to produce income for the seller. A payment made by the seller for accounting 




The other argument for this option is that the amount is deductible by the seller for income 
tax purposes. The amount was actually incurred because the seller paid the buyer for taking 
over the accounting provisions. For the expenditure to be in the production of income, it 
can be argued that the payment was made while the seller was still trading. The third 
requirement for the expenditure to be deductible under section 11(a) of the Act is that the 
expenditure must not be of a capital nature. The expenditure is not of a capital nature 
because the purpose of the payment is not of a capital nature.  
 
SARS allows the deduction of the payment by the seller because the seller is still trading at 
the time the seller makes the payment. SARS is also of the opinion that the expenditure is 
incurred in the production of income and there is no argument that the payment is of a 
capital nature.This option is not frequently used because the exchange of money (the seller 
paying the buyer to take over the liabilities and the buyer paying the seller for the assets) 
between the two parties is burdensome. The next option that will be discussed below is 
frequently used when the agreement states that the assets and liabilities are taken over by 
the buyer and the net amount is the purchase price. 
 
Option 2 – the purchase consideration is the net asset value 
Sales agreements usually state that the buyer will purchase the assets for a specified 
amount and assume the liabilities for another amount, the two amounts are then offset and 
the net purchase price is paid. The provisions are then taken over by the buyer.44  
 
Option 3 – seller retains obligation  
Under the third option, when the seller ceases trading and sells the business, no further 
deductions can be claimed under section 11(a) of the Act because the expense will not be 
incurred in the production of income. However, if the expenditure is incurred due to an 
obligation assumed while trading, it is still deductible under section 11(a) of the Act even 
if it is paid after trading ceases.  
 
                                                 
44
 This method was used in the ITC 1839 case. 
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In ITC 729, the following was held: 
An employer, as part of the wages to an employee, gives him an undertaking that when he 
retires he will be paid a pension. That undertaking amounts to a laying out of moneys for 
the purposes of trade. Nor does paragraph (g) state that the moneys must be laid out or 
expended for the purpose of trade during the year for which the assessment is being made. 
The paragraph is in wide terms and only requires that the payment must be one which was 
for the purposes of trade, so that once it is established that the obligation to make the 
payment was for the purpose of trade, then when that obligation is discharged it remains a 
payment for the purposes of trade. 
 
In ITC 490 and ITC 729, expenditures were judged deductible for income tax purposes 
even after trading ceased (for example, after the selling of the business). When the 
accounting provision is retained by the seller, the expense can be deducted for income tax 
purposes if the requirements of section 11(a) of the Act are met. Because the business has 
been sold, no income will be available from the business to be reduced by the expenditure 
and the seller will possibly incur a loss that cannot be used. If the seller has income from 
other businesses, the loss can be used to reduce the income from the other businesses. 
  
The seller of the business would therefore not want to retain the obligation for accounting 
provisions. The buyer in this option will not have taken over the accounting provisions and 
the buyer will therefore have no income tax implications for these provisions.  
 
8 CONCLUSION  
From the study it is apparent that one must never lose sight of the tax implications in 
finalising a deal. As submitted by Kroukamp (2006:3):  
Taxes can play a large part in adding value to a deal if managed properly, and conversely, 
destroy a deal if not handled with care. 
If the taxpayer in ITC 1839 had retained the contingent liabilities and been responsible for 
paying them as they fell due, the expenditure would have been deductible despite the 




On the one hand, with respect, it can be cogently argued that a taxpayer who instead 
relieves himself of contingent liabilities at the time of the sale by way of a deduction 
against the purchase price must be in an equal position. It would be difficult for the seller 
to have to retain staff responsibilities and other relevant infrastructure simply to deal with 
retained liabilities. The expenditure should retain its character of the underlying contingent 
liabilities whether he settles them as and when they fall due, or instead sees to it that the 
liabilities get assumed by someone else. As submitted in Chapter three, it could also be 
said that a payment to the purchaser (i.e. the set-off) may be compared with paying an 
insurance premium to a third party. 
 
When the seller incurs expenditure in by way of the set-off, the mere fact that he suffered 
no economic expenditure should be of no consequence. Although it may be argued that the 
expenditure was not actually incurred, as actually incurred presupposes a cost to the 
taxpayer, our tax law has never indicated an economic loss to be a qualification for a 
deduction (also refer to 3.5.3). The only fact that is relevant for income tax purposes is the 
expenditure incurred in honouring the obligations.   
 
But on the other hand, and as decided by the court, having dealt with the rather 
complicated assumption that an expense has incurred, the expense was more closely 
connected to the sale of the business than to the prior production of income and hence not 
deductable.  
 
It is unfortunate that the court did not have a view of the tax consequences of the 
contingent liabilities for the purchaser. But, if one considers all the arguments that has been 
submitted in this thesis, it would seem that an logical overall conclusion is that the 
contingent liabilities in the seller‘s hand should not deductible, the receipt of that amount 
by the purchaser should not taxable and the payment by the purchaser of the contingent 
liabilities should be deductible when they fell due. As Clegg (2010b:72) submitted, this 




Further, it must always be remembered that the wording of the sale agreement plays an 
important part and must be carefully reviewed before finalising the tax consequences of 
accounting provisions.  
 
Another possible view, not discussed in this thesis, could be the possibility of 
apportionment. Accordingly recognising both the services rendered by the employees and 
the sale of the business as causative factors. On the authority of Tuck v CIR, a case dealt 
with accruals but the principle of which must apply equally to expenditure, a fifty-fifty 
apportionment might have been appropriate (Clegg 2010b:71).  
 
As submitted Corbett CJ in by Clegg‘s (2010b:72) article:  
There is no equity in a tax…but there is nevertheless a measure of satisfaction to be gained 
from as a result which seems equitable, both from the point of view of the taxpayer and from 
the point of view of the fiscus. 
 
This study is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of ITC 1839 or the income tax 
consequences of the transfer of contingent liabilities. Instead, this study investigates  
ITC 1839 and the possible tax consequences attached thereto for the seller of and also 
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